Lewis' Strawman PDF
ABSTRACT. In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, Strawman. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. These theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing that he underestimates Strawman’s theoretical resources in a variety of important ways.
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2002). Lewis' Strawman, The Philosophical Quarterly, 52:206, pp. 55-65. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00252
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2002). Lewis' Strawman, The Philosophical Quarterly, 52:206, pp. 55-65. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00252