Boghossian on Analyticity PDF
ABSTRACT. Paul Boghossian (1997) has argued that there is much to be said on behalf of the notion of analyticity so long as we distinguish epistemic analyticity and metaphysical analyticity. In particular, (1) epistemic analyticity isn’t undermined by Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, (2) it can explain the a prioricity of logic, and (3) epistemic analyticity can’t be rejected short of embracing semantic irrealism. In this paper, we argue that all three of these claims are mistaken.
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2001). Boghossian on Analyticity. Analysis, 61.4, pp. 293-302. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8284.00308
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2001). Boghossian on Analyticity. Analysis, 61.4, pp. 293-302. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8284.00308