Eric Margolis
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PHIL 551 The Origins of Concepts

What underlies our ability to acquire the rich and varied concepts that structure how we think about the world? Do human conceptual capacities largely trace back to a powerful form of general intelligence? Or do they depend in part on innate special-purpose psychological systems for thinking in specific types of ways? This seminar will explore the latter (nativist) approach to the origins of concepts. We will discuss different interpretations of the nativist position and how it relates to debates about nature-nurture and debates about what it might mean to say that a trait is innate. We will also examine a surprisingly large number of arguments that factor into the case for a nativist approach, while taking up a variety of important case studies (for example, the origins of such concepts as ‘belief, ‘cause’, and ‘number’).  

Core seminar
This course has been designated a core seminar for the 2020-2021 academic year. Core seminars are suitable for philosophy graduate students with varying levels of background in a given subject area, including first-year graduate students, and may be used to satisfy the PhD course distribution requirement. For more information about core seminars, see the Philosophy Department’s graduate regulations.

Covid-19 notice
In the event that this course has to take place online, it will still be organized as seminar with the usual focus on class discussion and student presentations, using Zoom or an equivalent video conference tool.

Texts
  • Laurence and Margolis, The Building Blocks of Thought: Concept Nativism and the Debate over Innate Ideas
  • A mix of philosophical and scientific articles and chapters. The complete list and links will be available on the course website.

Permission is required to take this course for students who are not members of the Philosophy graduate program. Please e-mail me for further information.