Concepts and Cognitive Science PDF

ABSTRACT. Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of controversy regarding what kinds of things concepts are, how they are structured, and how they are acquired. This chapter offers a detailed high-level overview and critical evaluation of the main theories of concepts and their motivations. Taking into account the various challenges that each theory faces, the chapter also presents a novel approach to concepts that is organized around two ideas. The first is a pluralistic view of differing types of conceptual structure. The second is a model that treats concepts as atomic representations that are linked to various types of conceptual structures.

Laurence, S., & Margolis, E. (1999). Concepts and Cognitive Science, In Concepts: Core Readings, E. Margolis & S. Laurence (eds.), pp. 3-81.

Related papers

• Concepts (entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)